This paper presents a specific-factor model showing that under uncertainty increasing trade integration is not always welfare increasing. The reason is that changes in the country's specialization level induced by trade integration produce both benefits and costs. Increasing specialization increases wages (efficiency gains), but, modifying the taxation mechanism that finances the insurance providing Welfare State, it tends to reduces workers' net wage. The model identifies a trade-off, absent in the standard deterministic model, between gains from specialization and the gains from insurance. It is shown that, depending on the parameter's configuration, it exists a specialization level beyond which the benefit of specialization becomes lower than the increase in the cost of insurance. It follows that if the economy specializes too much aggregate expected income under free trade becomes lower than under autarky.
averse, it is also possible that autarky becomes Pareto superior to free trade (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984) . Furthermore, differently from what happens in the deterministic case, there are numerous instances in which government intervention is welfare increasing precisely because it forces the country out of the free trade equilibrium (Eaton and Grossman, 1985; Brainard, 1991) . Several authors have also emphasized that as globalization proceeds, since higher trade integration may increase the level of uncertainty each country faces, there is probably the need for more and not less Welfare State (Andersen (2002) , Bowles and Pagano, 2006) . While deterministic models focus on how the presence of the Welfare State interferes with the ability of countries to exploit the opportunities offered by globalization 1 , Rodrik (1997) argues that under uncertainty, in order to evaluate the optimality and the sustainability of freer trade, it would be instead crucial to explicitly consider the impact of increasing trade integration on the Welfare State. His model shows that, if globalization increases the cost of maintaining the Welfare State (only) for the immobile factor (i.e. labour), it is possible that workers' support to keep the domestic market open would progressively decrease to the point that a return to protectionism becomes a real possibility.
The present paper identifies another channel through which a similar outcome can be obtained.
The basic intuition is that, under uncertainty, increasing trade integration entails both benefits and costs. On the one hand, the trade-induced increase in the specialization level is beneficial because it increases allocational efficiency and thus wages. But, on the other hand, it is also costly because to increase specialization modifies the taxation mechanism that finances the insurance providing Welfare State and reduces workers' net wage. The main result of the model is that, if the trade-induced increase in the specialization level is too much, aggregate (expected) income under free trade becomes lower than under autarky.
The trade-off between benefits and cost of opening to free trade when there is uncertainty and workers are risk averse is formalized using a two-sector specific factor model modified to consider: 1) uncertainty, in the form of stochastic production technologies; 2) temporary specificity of the mobile factor (labour). At the beginning of the first period, the realization of the stochastic parameter determines which sector is lucky, i.e. the comparative advantaged sector, and the unlucky, i.e. the comparatively disadvantaged one. While capital is sector specific, labour is mobile across sectors. But workers' mobility is not perfect: workers cannot relocate immediately after uncertainty resolves. This gives room to the welfare increasing insurance-provider role for the Welfare State.
The (benevolent) government has the objective to equalize incomes across sectors in each period.
To this end it provides a Welfare State in the form of a tax-based system of state-contingent transfers.
In the second period, when uncertainty has resolved, workers in the lucky sector are taxed to finance a transfer τ that goes to all the workers in the unlucky sector. The most important feature of this insurance mechanism is that preferences and workers' specialization decision determine the sectoral tax level necessary to finance the system. In the paper two distinct ways of choosing the level of the transfer τ are considered. First, τ is treated as a fixed parameter. Second, it is studied the effects of τ when its level is chosen by a benevolent government in order to maximize the welfare gain produced by the Welfare State.
The present model, by considering the impact of free trade-induced level of specialization on the working of the Welfare State and on the optimality of free trade, provides an argument against any naive application of the comparative advantage doctrine. Indeed, identifying a new to the literature trade-off between gains from specialization (due to higher trade integration) and the gains from insurance (due to the presence of the Welfare State) both depending on the level of specialization, it shows that the gains from trade are not necessarily increasing in the level of trade integration. To the best of my knowledge this is new to the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a two-sector specific factor trade model with uncertainty in which the government uses a tax-based insurance mechanism, i.e. the Welfare State, to equalize incomes of risk averse agents. In section 3, both the autarky and the free trade equilibrium are described. In addition it is measured the welfare effects of moving from autarky to free trade and of introducing the Welfare State under both scenarios. Finally the conditions under which autarky is welfare superior with respect to free trade are derived. Section 4 concludes.
The model
In this section it is presented a specific-factor model with technological uncertainty and it is introduced a stylized Welfare State in the form of a tax-based insurance mechanism. Following the trade under uncertainty literature (see for instance Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) ), the the following two assumptions are made. First, the market fails to provide insurance for specific investments. In the present model, this assumption is even less heroic since it is considered a case of human capital investment. In fact, in such a situation the well-know problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are particularly strong and the market is unlikely to provide insurance for wage variance. 2 Second, workers cannot fully diversify risk through international capital markets. In fact, while it is true that there is an increasing trend in this direction, this possibility still pertain primarily to institutional investors, i.e. pension funds. 3 
Production and uncertainty
Consider a small country populated by N identical risk averse maximizing workers. There are three goods. Goods x and y are manufactured for export, while good z is imported for consumption. The latter is the numeraire good. 4 Both export sectors are subject to uncertainty in the form of a sector 2 Andersen (2002) argues that international integration is not reducing capital markets problems related to human capital insurance.
3 According to van Wincoop (1991) the assumption that there is no international trade in risky assets is a more realistic assumption than the opposite. 4 This assumption limits the effect of uncertainty on consumption to indirect effect through income (Brainard, 1991) . specific stochastic technology parameter θ i with i = x, y. The two export sectors are described by the following production technologies:
where L i is the labour input in sector i (with L x + L y =L), θ i is the sector specific stochastic technology parameter. K and T are, respectively, sector x and y specific capital that, for the sake of simplicity, is assumed to be owned by foreign agents. The stochastic parameters are distributed according to the following binomial distributions:
where j is the state of the world, with
Sector i = {x, y} is said to be lucky if θ i = 1, i.e. if the sectoral output level is positive. 5 This simple way of modeling uncertainty could describe a number of situations. Among these: 1) cases of (extreme) technological uncertainty, e.g. the case of agricultural production subject to large environmental variability; 2) instances in which comparative advantages have a stochastic component that dominates the institutional and economic determinants of sectoral relative productivities. Thus, this simple scheme makes the present model able to capture an important aspect of international trade, i.e. the fact that comparative advantages may be (to a certain extent) undetermined. One of the objectives of the paper is indeed to derive some implications from this fact for the optimality of opening to free trade.
Labour income and the Welfare State
Workers are assumed to be internationally immobile, i.e. because of cultural and/or linguistic barriers.
Each is endowed with one unit of labour that she inelastically supplies in a competitive labor market.
Aggregate labour supply (and total number of workers) in sector i is given by:
where s h is individual labour supply. Good markets are perfectly competitive. In each sector, wage equals the value of the marginal product of labour. Sectoral wage in sector x and y is thus given, respectively, by:
5 Note that, while the assumption of perfectly negatively correlated sectoral outputs makes calculations much easier, for the model's results to hold it is sufficient that outputs are not perfectly positively correlated.
where p i , is the market price of good i = {x, y}.
At the beginning of the period, before the state of the world is known, each worker decides in which domestic sector to invest her unit of human capital, i.e. where to be employed. The equilibrium condition is given by the equalization of expected utility across sectors, i.e. E(U y ) = E(U x ). Once the investment decision has been made, the worker is assumed to become (temporary) specific to the sector she is employed into. Then uncertainty resolves and it is determined which is the lucky sector.
The specificity assumption implies that, after uncertainty resolves, the worker cannot immediately move from one sector to the other. It is precisely the existence of this 'friction' that, as it will be shown below, makes the insurance device represented by the Welfare State always welfare increasing. Assume, for instance, that sector y turns out to be lucky, i.e. the sector in which (ex-post) the country enjoys a comparative advantage. In this case, the export of sector y is positive and sector x does not export. In this case, the government's budget constraint reads:
where τ is the individual transfer each worker in sector x (i.e. the unlucky sector) receives, t y is the wage tax imposed on workers in sector y (i.e. the lucky sector), L y and L x is the number of workers employed in sector y and x, respectively. The tax rate in sector y is thus given by:
Equation (3) makes clear that the sectoral tax rate necessary to finance the Welfare State depends on workers' specialization decisions.
In the present paper two distinct ways of choosing the level of τ will be considered. First, τ will be treated as a fixed parameter: in this case the level of the transfer can be thought as the result of a (non-modeled) ex-ante bargaining process between the workers and the government. In the second case, the level of τ is not fixed but changes with the trade-induced level of specialization since the 6 In principle this insurance scheme could be possible privately provided. However, "it is difficult to imagine endowing private agencies with the extensive monitoring and enforcement rights enjoyed by tax authorities. In the absence of such rights, moral hazard and adverse selection problems government choses the level of the transfer in order to maximize the welfare increasing effect of the Welfare State. 7 The analysis of the model begins considering τ as a parameter, postponing the case of the 'optimal' τ to section 3.4.
Labour Income Labour income for workers in sector y is:
where ω y = (1 − t y )w y is the net of taxes sectoral wage. Using (2):
NormalizingL = 1, income in sector x is given by
Expected utility of workers in sector i is given by
where E(·) is the expectation operator and
is workers' utility in sector i when the state of the world is j and z = {a, f t} is the superscript to indicate that the variable refers to the autarky or the free trade situation, respectively. The parameter r ≥ 0 measures the degree of risk aversion. Equation (4) is a standard risk averse utility function featuring constant absolute risk aversion (r) and increasing relative risk aversion (rI).
Results
In this section the autarky and the free trade equilibrium are determined and compared and it is discussed how the presence of the Welfare State affects the optimality of opening to free trade. Since the focus of the model is not on consumption decision, workers are assumed to spend an equal share of their income for each good. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that K = T and that π 1 = π 2 = π,
i.e. the two states of the world are equi-probable. These assumptions greatly simplify the analysis because they imply that the autarky equilibrium coincides with a perfectly symmetrical economy (see below). This makes much more intuitive and straightforward the comparison between the autarky and the free trade equilibrium but it clearly does not affect the generality of the results.
Autarky
As a consequence of the symmetry assumptions made, the labour-output ratio is equal in the two sectors and the domestic relative price is p a = p y /p x = 1. It also follows that at the autarky equilibrium workers are equally distributed among the two sectors. Formally, it holds that:
The effect of the Welfare State under autarky As a first step, let considered the introduction of the Welfare State in the economy under autarky. In order to evaluate the effect of the tax-based insurance mechanism, it is compared the aggregate welfare (computed as the sum of individual expected utilities) in the two situations. Define the difference between aggregate welfare under autarky with and without the Welfare State as:
where
is the expected welfare under autarky when there is the Welfare State and
is the aggregate expected welfare under autarky when there is no Welfare State.
Proposition 1 Under autarky, the Welfare State is welfare improving and its positive effect increases with the degree of workers' risk aversion.
Proof. See Appendix Proposition 1 states that when there is uncertainty the tax-based insurance mechanism is worth pursuing. In addition, it demonstrates that the higher the risk aversion the more effective is the Welfare State. The result that the insurance mechanism is welfare improving when the environment is uncertain is clearly shown by Figure 1 which plots 8 the difference (for any given level of risk aversion)
between the autarky welfare level with Welfare State and without it. 
Free trade
Under the small country assumption, when the country enters free trade its domestic relative price converges to the world one. Assume, for instance p f t = p f t y /p f t x > p a = 1, with p f t y > p a y and p f t x = p a x , i.e. that the Home country has a comparative advantage in sector y. This implies that, at the autarky equilibrium allocation of workers, it holds that:
Opening to free trade modifies the relative profitability of the two sectors, making expected utility in sector y higher than the one in sector x. As a consequence, workers reallocate toward sector y, i.e. the sector in which the country has the comparative advantage, and the free trade equilibrium is reached when expected utilities are equalized for the value of the free trade relative price p f t . Noting that in a two-sector model the level of specialization is given by the ratio of the number of workers employed in each sector and that our benchmark situation is the perfectly symmetrical autarky equilibrium, it follows that the country level of specialization increases with the free trade price.
In the following, it will be compared the free trade equilibrium (with and without Welfare State) with the autarky one.
Free trade vs autarky As in the standard deterministic model also in the present one when there is no provision of Welfare State, the free trade equilibrium is always welfare superior to autarky. 9 This is stated in the following:
Proposition 2 With no Welfare State, free trade is always welfare superior to autarky. Trade gains are larger the higher the specialization level induced by free trade, and smaller the higher the degree of worker's risk aversion. 9 Note that here the comparison is between the simple sum of workers' expected utilities under free trade and under autarky. No discussion will be made concerning Pareto superiority of free trade over autarky. 
Proof. See Appendix
While the fact that the welfare gain of opening to trade is increasing in the free trade-induced specialization level is not surprising, the presence of uncertainty has an interesting and less obvious effect. Under uncertainty, the benefit of free trade decreases with the degree of risk aversion. This implies that for high level of r the welfare gain of opening-up the economy becomes negligible. This is shown in Figure 2 which plots, for any given level of risk aversion, the welfare difference between free trade and autarky for each free trade-induced specialization level (L y ). 10 The effect of the Welfare State under free trade The next step is to compare the free trade aggregate welfare level with and without the Welfare State. While the taxation mechanism is the same as under autarky, the values that the transfer τ can assume have now to be restricted. Indeed, Condition 1 An increase in the free trade price induces an increase in the specialization level under the condition that τ <τ Condition 1 implies that if τ >τ , i.e. if the transfer is too high, an increase in p f t = p f t y /p f t x would induce a reduction of L f t y . In other words, opening to free trade would induce the country to specialize against its comparative advantages. If, on the contrary, 0 < τ <τ , the higher the free trade price the higher the trade-induced specialization level.
Under Condition 1, the effects of the presence of a Welfare State under free trade are described in the following:
Proposition 3 Under free trade, the Welfare State is always welfare increasing. Its positive effect increases with the degree of risk aversion. 10 Recalling that at the symmetric autarky equilibrium L a = 0.5, it follows that the higher L f t y the higher the free-trade induced country specialization level. Gains from specialization and insurance gains Lets now compare the effect on aggregate welfare of opening to free trade and of supplying the Welfare State. While the benefit from opening to free trade comes in the form of specialization gains, the Welfare State is beneficial to workers because it supplies insurance against risk. Under free trade, for any configuration of the economy's parameters, the difference between specialization gains and insurance gains is given by:
To understand the definition given by equation (6) , note that W f t depends on the free trade price, i.e.
on the free trade-induced specialization level and that W a tax is equivalent to the welfare level under free trade with Welfare State when p f t = 1 (i.e. when there are no specialization gains). Thus the first term captures only the specialization gains while the second only the effect of insurance (for each level of specialization). It is easy to show that:
The relative welfare benefit of specialization with respect to insurance is increasing in the trade-induced specialization level but decreasing in the degree of risk aversion.
Proposition 4 is interesting because it implies that, as shown by the numerical example plotted in Figure 3 , Θ could become negative.
The main result: gains from specialization and the Welfare State
This section describes the main result of the paper. As shown in Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, the Welfare State is welfare improving under both autarky and free trade, and it is thus interesting to The welfare difference between the free trade and the autarky equilibrium when there is the Welfare State under both scenarios is given by:
is the aggregate expected welfare under free trade with the Welfare State and
is expected welfare under autarky with Welfare State. Free trade is welfare superior to autarky if: 11
Inequality (7) describes the trade-off between gains from specialization and the cost of maintaining the Welfare State. Indeed, on the left-hand side there is the difference between the wage rate under free trade and autarky (i.e. it measures the free-trade induced specialization gains) while on the right-hand side there is the change in the cost of suppling the Welfare State that also depends on the distribution of workers across sectors. The sign of inequality (7) does crucially depends upon the parameter τ and 11 See the Appendix for the derivation.
on the induced level of specialization L f t y . If τ = 0 (i.e. there is no Welfare State), free trade is, as in the standard deterministic model, always superior to autarky (see also Proposition 2). This is not true when the transfer is positive. As shown by the numerical example reported in Figure 4 , opening to trade is welfare improving for a large interval of free trade-induced specialization levels and the gain increases with the level of specialization (L f t y ) though decreasing with the degree of risk aversion. But there exists a level of specialization L * y beyond which the welfare level under free trade with Welfare State becomes lower than the corresponding autarky one. This is the main result of the paper and it is stated in the following:
Proposition 5 Opening to free trade does not necessarily increase welfare when there is a Welfare State and agents are risk averse. When the free trade-induced specialization level is too high, free trade becomes welfare inferior with respect to autarky.
Proof. See Appendix
Why does free trade becomes sub-optimal if the induced specialization level is too high? The increase in the country level of specialization implies higher wages for all workers but it also, through its effect on the tax rate (see eq. (3)), reduces their net wage, making the Welfare State more costly to the workers. When the increase in the cost of insurance becomes larger than the specialization gains, free trade becomes welfare inferior with respect to autarky.
Sensitivity of the result to the parameters' values The previous result crucially depends upon two parameters: 1) the probability for the comparative advantaged sector y to be lucky (π 1 ); 2) the level of the transfer (τ ).
Concerning the first, numerical solutions confirm the intuitive result that an increase in the probability that the comparative advantaged sector (i.e. sector y) is 'lucky' (i.e. higher values of π 1 ) makes free trade more attractive. 12 It also results that, for each level of risk aversion, there is a level of π 1 for which free trade is always superior to autarky with Welfare State, even if this level increases with r.
The analysis of the second is more complex. When the level of the transfer is exogenously fixed, ceteris paribus, a smaller τ has four effects. First, the welfare gain from insurance is smaller. Second, the smaller τ , the larger the range of free trade prices for which specialization gains are higher than insurance gains (see eq. (6)). Indeed, the smaller the transfer, the smaller the individual tax burden for any trade-induced specialization level and the smaller its welfare effect. Third, a smaller τ makes larger the range of specialization levels for which the welfare system is sustainable, i.e. t i < 1 with i = {x, y} (recall eq. (3)). Four, the smaller the transfer, the larger the interval of free trade-induced 12 Conversely, if the comparative advantaged sector is subject to high sectoral risk, i.e. the difference (π1 − π2) is very small, the expected welfare gain of free trade is lower. specialization levels for which free trade is welfare superior with respect to autarky. 13 To this regard note that when τ = 0, free trade is always better than autarky. These values are reported in Figure 5 .
Since the level of the transfer plays a crucial role in determining the main result of the model in the following paragraph a different way of choosing τ is considered.
Optimal transfer
While until now τ entered the model as a fixed parameter, it will be now considered the case in which the level of τ is optimally chosen, under both autarky and free trade, by a benevolent welfare maximizer government.
Definition 1
The optimal transfer τ * is the value of τ that, for given level of risk aversion and level of specialization, maximizes the welfare gain of the Welfare State.
Lets begin describing some results concerning the value of the optimal transfer under autarky and free trade. The symmetry assumptions made imply that under autarky the optimal level of the transfer does not depend on the degree of risk aversion. Instead, it depends on α: when the distributive parameter increases (i.e. the share of aggregate income that goes to labour decreases), the optimal level of τ decreases and the welfare gain of the Welfare State decreases as well. The optimal level of τ under autarky is τ * a = 0.35 and it is unique. Ceteris paribus, when ω a > τ , the higher the transfer the higher the welfare effect of the insurance mechanism. 14 When ω a < τ , the higher τ the lower the welfare.
13 See Appendix. 14 This result obviously depends on the assumed no-distortionary nature of taxation.
Numerical results show that under free trade, for given degree of risk aversion, the optimal level of the transfer decreases with the free trade price. 15 Thus, since a lower transfer reduces the sectoral tax rates, net wages are increasing in the free trade-induced specialization level. It also results that the optimal level of the transfer is increasing in the level of risk aversion. Finally, numerical results shows that, as in the case in which the transfer is exogenously fixed, the welfare gain of introducing a Welfare State with τ = τ * increases with the degree of risk aversion but decreases with the level of specialization. Proposition 1 and 3 describe the welfare effect of the Welfare State for a given level of the transfer.
Since, as we have just seen, the optimal value of τ depends on r but also on p f t (i.e. it depends on the level of specialization), let now compare autarky and free trade with Welfare State when the transfer is set to the optimal level τ * . Figure 6 , 7 and 8 plot, for a given level of risk aversion, the difference between autarky and free trade welfare when τ = τ * . The results show that for low levels of risk aversion, free trade is always welfare superior to autarky. But as risk aversion increases, the set of specialization levels for which autarky is welfare superior to free trade enlarges. Indeed, an increase in the specialization level increases the tax rate needed to finance the Welfare State. Since this increases income variability, the higher the risk aversion the more welfare reducing is opening to trade.
These results are important because they demonstrate that the main result of the model does not depend upon some sub-optimal transfer rule. In fact, even in the case in which the transfer is assumed to be set at the optimal level by a maximizing benevolent central planner, the expected welfare under free trade can be lower than the corresponding autarky one if the country specializes too much.
Concluding remarks
This paper presented a simple model to analyze the optimality of moving from autarky to free trade when increasing trade integration entails both benefits and costs. The basic intuition is that under uncertainty, changes in the specialization level induced by opening up the economy not only determines the gains from trade but also the cost of supplying a Welfare State. As a first step it has been derived the conditions under which the provision of the tax-based insurance scheme, i.e. the Welfare State, is welfare increasing under autarky and free trade when workers are risk averse. Then it has been shown that the superiority of free trade over autarky crucially depends on the effects that opening up the economy has on the working of the Welfare State. The main result of the model is that, under proper limitation of the parameters' space, if the economy specializes too much the increase in the cost of insurance may become larger than the gains from opening up the economy. In this case, the free trade 15 The optimal transfer under free trade is calculated, using ad hoc MATLAB programs, in the following way. Given the level of risk aversion, the program calculates the welfare level in absence of Welfare State for any level of the free trade price. Then, for each free trade price and any sustainable level of τ (i.e. the level of the transfer for which tx < 1 and ty < 1), it computes the welfare level when there is the Welfare State. The optimal τ for a given level of free trade price (and risk aversion) is the value of τ that maximizes the difference between the two computed welfare levels. The code programs and the detailed results are available upon request. equilibrium turns out to be welfare inferior with respect to the autarky one. This result is interesting for two reasons. First, the result does not depend on the effect of higher trade integration on the level of uncertainty facing the economy. Indeed, differently from other models in the literature (see e.g.
Andersen (2002)), no assumption is made concerning the way in which the former affects the latter.
Second, the mechanism behind the main result of the paper also applies when it is considered the opportunity to increase trade barriers, i.e. a movement from a free trade position toward a situation in which there is a positive level of protection. Noting that a lower level of specialization reduces the cost of the insurance redistributive scheme, it follows that, if agents' level of risk aversion is high, increasing protection has a first order effect on aggregate welfare while the productivity loss (due to de-specialization and allocative inefficiency) is of second order. In this sense the optimal rule for increasing (reducing) protection would state that efficiency gains should never be higher (lower) than insurance gain (loss).
One possible solution to the negative effect of higher trade integration highlighted in the present paper would be the creation of a reliable system of international insurance (Pagano, 2004) . But in the likely absence of it, free trade can, via the mechanism here described, bring a reduction in aggregate welfare in each and all countries. Thus the model shows that a 'naive' application of the comparative advantage doctrine may be misleading and that, since gains from specialization and the cost of insurance are the two sides of the same coin, only a good balance between the two would insure the maximization of country and world's welfare.
A convenient feature of the present model is that its basic framework could be easily extended.
Two directions seems particularly promising. The model could be easily generalized to consider also other sources of gains from trade, i.e. technological spillovers or increasing returns. Since the basic idea of the model is that increasing specialization increases the gains from trade but it also has an impact on the cost of supplying a Welfare State, the main message of the present paper will remain if other 
In the following, in order to simplify notation, a is omitted. Since in equilibrium sectoral expected utilities are equalized under each system (i.e. with and without Welfare State), condition (8) (3)), the previous inequality can be rewritten as (e rτ − 1) e rwy − e rτ e rwy e rτ > 0 (9) which is always true if w y > τ . Finally, note that (9) (and thus ∆) is increasing in the level of r.
Thus, the higher the risk aversion the higher the positive effect of the Welfare State.
Proof of Proposition 2 Define Λ the difference between aggregate welfare under free trade and autarky:
Since in equilibrium, under each system, utility is equalized across sectors, it follows that:
Thus, free trade is welfare superior to autarky if
i.e. when 1 e rwa > 1 e rw f t Since w f t > w a , free trade is always welfare superior to autarky. In addition, note it also immediatly follows that:
• for given r, the higher w f t (i.e. the higher the free trade price and thus the induced specialization level), the more welfare increasing is free trade ∂Λ ∂r = r e rw f t > 0
• for given wages, the higher the risk aversion the lower the gains from specialization ∂Λ ∂w f t = −w a e rw f t + w f t e rwa e rwa e rw f t < 0
Proof of Proposition 3
The welfare effect of introducing a Welfare State under free trade is given
by
To simplify notation the index f t is omitted. Since expected utilities are equalized across sectors in each system, Ω is positive when:
Since e rwy > e rτ , the necessary condition for Ω > 0 is that τ > t y w y Given equation (3), it follows that if p f t = p f t y /p f t x > 1 this is always true. In addition, differentiating equation (10), it yields that ∂Ω ∂r > 0
i.e., the higher the degree of risk aversion the higher the welfare gain from introducing the Welfare State.
Proof of Proposition 4
As explained in the text, the difference between the gains from specialization and the gains from insurance is given by the difference between aggregate welfare under free trade and under autarky with Welfare State:
which is equilibrium can be rewritten as:
While the sign of Θ depends on the parameters' values, it can be derived the effect on Θ of changes in the free trade price and in the degree of risk aversion.
Differentiating (11) with respect to w f t (which is a monotonic positive function of the free trade price and of the induced specialization level), it yields: ∂φ ∂w f t = r e rw f t > 0 thus, the welfare difference between the benefit of free trade with respect to the (insurance) benefit of the Welfare State is increasing in the induced specialization level.
The effect of higher risk aversion on the relative benefits of specialization and insurance is given by the sign of: ∂φ ∂r = e rτ e rwa w f t − w a e 2rτ e rw f t + τ e rw f t e 2rτ − τ e rw f t e rwa e rw f t e rwa e rτ (12)
Since the denominator is always positive, ∂φ ∂r is positive if:
Given that e rw f t > e rτ > 1, the necessary condition for the sign of (12) to be positive is
which is never true. It follows that (12) is always negative.
Derivation of Condition 1 As first step, it is derived the equilibrium condition under free trade when there is the Welfare State assuming, as before, that the two states of the world are equi-probable.
The equilibrium condition is:
Using equation (3), the tax rate under free trade in sector y is given by:
The net wage in sector y can thus be written as:
The derivation of the net wage in sector x is identical and yields:
To simplify notation in the following f t is omitted. Since the transfer τ and the level of risk aversion are assumed identical for all workers, the equilibrium allocation condition (i.e. the equality of expected utilities) reduces to:
The solution of equation (13) gives the equilibrium allocation of workers under free trade when there is the Welfare State. While equation (13) cannot be explicitly solved, it is possible to derive some of its properties. Let begin describing the effect of an increase of the free trade price on the equilibrium allocation of workers. Recalling that p f t = p f t y :
At the equilibrium Φ = 0. Applying the implicit function theorem, it yields:
The sign of the numerator is given by
The denominator of (14) can be rewritten as
Since (15) is always positive, the sign of (14) is the same as the sign of (16) which depends on the level of τ . Equation (16) is positive if
Thus, if condition (17) is satisfied the sign of (14) is negative and thus an increase in the free trade price induces a reduction of the specialization level. In order to exclude this paradoxical case it is assumed that 0 < τ <τ . This is the necessary condition for the country to specialize according to its comparative advantages after opening to free trade.
Derivation of Equation (7) The welfare difference between free trade with the Welfare State and autarky with the Welfare State is given by:
Since the equilibrium condition under both autarky and free trade is the equalization of expected utilities in the two sectors, it follows that the sign of Γ is positive when:
which, if the transfer level is the same under autarky and free trade, is equal to
Simplifying:
The effect of chnages in the level of τ Inequality (18) can be rewritten as
Both the right-hand side and the left hand side are increasing with L f t y . The first derivatives are, respectively:
Since the rate of increase of the right side hand positively depends on the level of τ , it follows that the higher τ , the lower the level of specialization for which the left-side becomes lower than the right side, i.e. for which free trade becomes welfare inferior with respect to autarky.
Proof of Proposition 5
The first step of the Proof is to show that under free trade with Welfare State worker's utility is a concave function of the level of specialization, and thus that it has a maximum. Considering again utility in sector x and maximizing it with respect to the specialization level it yields:
Utility in sector x is thus maximized when
Thus for each level of the transfer there exists a specialization level that maximizes utility. If the trade-induced specialization level is higher than this value, i.e. when L f t y >L, free trade welfare decreases with L f t y . To conclude the Proof it is sufficient to observe that since, for given risk aversion and level of the transfer τ , the autarky welfare with Welfare State is fixed, it follows that there is a level of specialization beyond which welfare under free trade becomes lower than under autarky.
Appendix with full derivations [NOT FOR PUBBLICATION]
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider equation (5) 
The Welfare State is welfare increasing if
To simplify notation a is omitted. Since in equilibrium sectoral expected utilities are equalized under each system (i.e. with taxation and with no-taxation), condition (19) is satisfied if 
which is always true if w y > τ . Finally, note that (20) (and thus ∆) is increasing in the level of r.
Proof of Proposition 2 Define the difference between aggregate welfare under free trade and autarky:
Since, under each system, utility is equalized across sectors:
Free trade is welfare superior to autarky if (recall that U f t y2 = U a y2 = 0):
Since w f t > w a , free trade is always welfare superior to autarky. In addition, note that
• for given r, the higher w f t (i.e. the higher the free trade price and thus the induced specialization level), the more welfare increasing is free trade ∂Λ ∂w f t = r e rw f t > 0
• for given wages, the higher the risk aversion the lower the gains from specialization ∂Λ ∂r = −w a e rw f t + w f t e rwa e rwa e rw f t < 0
Proof of Proposition 3
The welfare effect of the Welfare State under free trade is given by
To simplify notation the index f t is omitted. Since expected utilities are equalized across sectors in each system, the sign of Ω is given by the difference between: 
Since e rwy > e rτ , the necessary condition for Ω > 0 is:
Recalling that t y = τ Lx wyLy (equation (3)), it follows that τ =
Lytywy Lx
and that the last inequality can be rewritten as
which is always true since it has been assumed p f t = p f t y /p f t x > 1. In addition, differentiating equation (22) 
Given that w y > τ and tw y = τ L x /L y < τ , it immediately follows that ∂Ω ∂r > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
The difference between the gains from specialization and the gains from insurance is given by aggregate welfare under free trade and under autarky with the Welfare State:
which in equilibrium can be rewritten as:
Differentiating (25) with respect to w f t , it yields ∂φ ∂w f t = r e rw f t > 0
The effect of higher risk aversion on the relative benefits of specialization and insurance is given by the sign of: The equilibrium condition is:
Since the transfer τ and the level of risk aversion are assumed identical for all workers, the equilibrium allocation condition (i.e. the equality of expected utilities) reduces to:
The solution of equation (29) gives the equilibrium allocation of workers under free trade. While equation (29) cannot be explicitly solved, it is possible to derive some of its properties. First, it is described the effect of an increase of the free trade price on the equilibrium allocation of workers.
Recalling that p f t = p f t y and that p f t x = 1, define:
The denominator of (31) can be rewritten as
Since (32) is always positive, the sign of (31) is the same as the sign of (33) which depends on the level of τ . Equation (33) is positive if 16
Thus, if condition (34) is satisfied the sign of (31) is negative and thus an increase in the free trade price induces a reduction of the specialization level. To exclude this paradoxical case and in order to consider only the case in which opening to free trade increases the specialization, the range of the admissible values that the transfer can assume is restricted to 0 < τ <τ . Since τ is fixed, utility is maximized when (1 − t f t x )w f t x is maximum. In the following f t is omitted to simplify notation. The utility maximization condition is: 
Simplifying the numerator it yields:
Thus for each level of the transfer there exist a specialization level that maximizes utility. If the trade induced specialization level is higher than this, i.e. when L f t y >L, increasing specialization would decrease free trade welfare.
